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I.  Introduction 
1.  The  European  Community  welcomes  the opportunity to 
present its views  on  the petition for  import 
relief by Bethlehem Steel Corporation  and  the 
United Steelworkers of America. 
2.  The  European  Community regrets that it is 
necessary to appear  once  again  in a  procedure 
for  import relief before the  ITC.  lie 
had  sincerely hoped  that Steel Arrangement 
of October  1982  between  the  Community  and  the 
u.s.  had put an end to tensions and controversies 
concerning  the  imports of steel from  the  EC  into 
the u.s.  We  have  seen  a  dispute over the 
trigger price mechanism.  We  have  had  litigation 
over antidumping  and anti-subsidy petitions. 
The Steel Arrangement of October  1982  was 
intended to provide  a  comprehensive  solution 
to these frictions.  European  Community 
institutions cannot avoid  feeling  of frustration 
that less than two  years later we  find ourselves - 2  -
again in a  situation which  jeopardizes the 
existence of  the Arrangement,  in a  situation 
which might  give  rise to requests  for 
compensation  and  - eventually  - retaliation, 
according to the rules of  GATT. 
3.  In addition,  unilateral restrictions on 
imports  from  the European  Community  would 
upset the  balanced  international framework 
established by the  1977  OECD  Consensus  on  trade 
in steel products.  You  should recall that 
according to Consensus  "Traditional trade 
flows  established under  normal  conditions 
of competition  [should]  not  be  severely 
disrupted"  and that "domestic policies to 
sustain steel firms  during crisis period 
should not shift the burden of adjustment 
to other countries and thus  increase the 
likelihood of restrictive trade actions 
by other countries."  The  European  Community's 
own  internal and external steel policy is 
part of this coherent  framework.  World 
steel industry is inter-dependent  and  U.S. 
import measures  cannot be  looked at in isolation. - 3  -
II.  Bethlehem and  United Steelworkers petition jeopardize 
the existence of  the Arrangement. 
1.  The  European  Community  is extremely preoccupied 
by the petition for  import relief under Article 
201  of the Trade Act.  The  Arrangement was 
conditioned upon  an  undertaking  by all major 
' 
u.s.  steel producers,  including Bethlehem, 
not to file any petition seeking  import relief 
under the u.s.  trade  laws.  Bethlehem gave 
·such an  undertaking  in its letter of October  21, 
1982  to Secretary of  Commerce  Malcolm Baldrige. 
Bethlehem violated its undertaking  when it 
filed its petition for relief under  section 201. 
2.  Bethlehem's petition jeopardizes the existence 
of the October 1982  Steel Arrangement between 
the European  Community  and  the u.s. 
Let me  quote  from Article  2  of the Arrangement: 
uif,  during the period in which this Arrangement 
is in effect, ••••  or investigations under 
Section  201  of the Trade Act of 1974, ••••  are 
initiated or petitions filed or litigation ----------------
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(including antitrust litigation)  instituted with 
respect to the Arrangement products,  and the 
petitioner or litigant is one  of those referred 
to in Article 2(a),  the ECSC  shall be entitled 
to terminate  the Arrangement with respect to 
some  or all of the Arrangement products,  after 
consultations with the U.S.,  at the earliest 
15  days  after such consultation." 
3.  The  European  Community  has  opened consultations 
with the u.s.  under Article  2  of the Arrangement. 
These consultations are still going  on.  That 
means:  we  ·have  not yet exercised our rights 
to terminate  the Arrangement.  Instead,  we 
have  chosen to participate in these proceedings 
in order to demonstrate that additional 
restrictions on  steel imports  from  the 
community to the u.s.  are not  justified. 
4.  In  spite of preoccupations about petition, 
European  Community is convinced that ITC 
will recognize  the  success of the Arrangement 
in addressing any injury that might  have  been 
attributable to EC  imports.  The  European - 5  -
Community  is therefore convinced that the  ITC 
will not  recommend  any additional measure  in 
order to restrict imports  from  the European 
Community  further  than already restricted 
under  the Arrangement. 
5.  As  mentioned before,  the European  Community 
already has  a  right to terminate the Arrangement, 
because  of Bethlehem's petition.  A fortiori, 
European  Community  can  terminate Arrangement 
if Bethlehem's petition leads to additional 
restrictions for European  imports,  i.e. 
if it leads to an additional burden on  the 
European  Community  and its steel producers. 
Additional measures  would affect the very 
objective,  the very purpose of the 
Arrangement.  Additional restrictions would 
seriously damage  the interests of the European 
community.  The European  Community  would 
therefore immediately examine all its 
options  under the Arrangement  and under  GATT. 
It would  have to consider both the termination 
of the Agreement and compensation and eventually - 6  -
retaliation according to Article  XIX  of  GATT. 
III.  The  Arrangement 
1.  Today,  we  tend to take the Arrangement  for  granted. 
However  useful  to remember that the Arrangement 
was  final  stage of extremely difficult and  .. 
delicate negotiations.  The  Arrangement was  a 
major  achievement·of diplomacy,  involving not 
only the  U.S.  and  the  EC  administrations,  but 
also the u.s.  and the  EC  industries.  The 
Arrangement was  a  major element of pacification 
putting an  end to years of tensions and  frictions 
between the U.S.  and the European  Community. 
Let  me  recall three reactions on  this side 
of the Atlantic:  On  21  October,  1982 President 
Reagan  said: 
"Reaching this agreement was  a  long  and arduous 
process,  and  I  want to  commend  both Secretary 
Baldrige and  his European  counterparts for their 
outstanding efforts.  They  have  resulted in a 
mutual  understanding that is reassuring 
evidence that America  and her allies and trading 
partners can work  together for the amicable - 7  -
settlement of differences in the  atmosphere 
of cooperation and understanding". 
On  the  same  day,  Secretary of  Commerce  l1alcolm 
Baldrige referred to the Arrangement as  follows: 
"[The  Arrangement]  removes  one of the most"' 
severe trade  frictions between  the United 
States and the European  Community  and 
demonstrates that we  can work  together for 
an  amicable  settlement of difficult disputes 
in an  atmosphere of cooperation,  understanding 
and  friendship." 
and  on October  25,  1982,  Senator John  Heinz 
described the Arrangement to Senate Steel 
caucus.  He  said: 
"Most of us who  have been  alarmed  by  rapidly 
growing  steel imports welcome this agreement. 
Its broad product coverage  and  fixed percentage 
limits will cut imports  from Europe.  It will 
also  improve  the  diplomatic  climate by 
heading off a  difficult and  lengthy trade 
dispute at a  time when  a  number  of other major - 8  -
disagreements  between  the United States and 
Western  Europe  are  already on  the table. 
Finally,  by  injecting some  certainty into 
the market during  a  period of  retrenchment 
everywhere,  it should better enable steel 
producers  on both sides of the Atlantic to 
plan and  invest for  the future". 
2.  The  statement by  Senator Heinz  reflects faithfully 
the basis of the Arrangement  and  its objective. 
Let me  quote the first paragraph of the Arrangement: 
"Recognizing the policy of the ECSC  of 
restructuring its steel industry including the 
progressive elimination of State aids pursuant 
to the ECSC  State Aids  Code;  recognizing also 
the process of modernization  and  structural 
change  in the United States of America  ••• 
recognizing the  importance  as concluded by 
the  OECD  of restoring the competitiveness of 
OECD  steel industries;  and  recognizing, 
therefore,  the importance of stability in 
trade in certain steel products  between the 
European  Community  and the U.S.A." - 9  -
"The  objective of the Arrangement  is to give 
time  to permit restructuring and therefore  to 
create  a  period of trade stability". 
3.  The  Arrangement  covers virtually all imports 
of steel products into the u.s.  Its product 
coverage  is therefore much  wider than present 
proceedings.  This is important  in view of 
the risk that Arrangement might be  terminated. 
4.  The  Arrangement  subjects most  important steel 
products to export quotas,  negotiated on  the 
basis of  a  three  year reference period:  1979-1981. 
IV.  Effects of the Arrangement 
1.  The Arrangement has drastically reduced  imports 
of steel products  from  the European  Community 
to the u.s.  The effects are best illustrated 
by  a  comparison of steel imports  into the 
u.s.  from the EC  in 1982  and 1983.  Total 
imports of steel were 5.6 million tons  in 1982. 
They  fell to 4.1 million tons  in 1983.  This is 
a  reduction of 26.5%. - 10  -
2.  Illustration in form of graphs. 
Five charts. 
Chart 1.  EC  import  share  and other country 
import  share  of total apparent domestic 
consumption of products subject to 
affirmative determination. 
. 
Chart  2.  EC  import  and other country  import  share 
of apparent domestic  consumption of 
plates. 
Chart  3.  EC  import  share and other country 
import  share of apparent domestic 
consumption  of  sheet and  strip. 
Chart  4.  EC  import  share and other country 
import  share of apparent domestic 
consumption of wire  and wire products. · 
Chart 5.  EC  import  share and other country  import 
share of apparent domestic  consumption 
of structural shapes and units. 
conunon  features: 
- European  Conununity  imports declined 
drastically after 1982  - the entry into 
force  of Arrangement. 
- Other foreign countries'  imports  surged: 
They not only filled the  gap  left by the 
European  Conununity,  but  they caused total 
import penetration levels to increase. - 11  -
3.  Our  conclusions  from  these data  are: 
First 
Additional  import relief for  imports  from 
the European  Communities  is not necessary. 
To  the extent that injury can  be attributed 
to imports,  it has  not been  caused  by  imports 
from  the European  Communities but  by  imports 
from  other countries. 
Second 
As  the Arrangement  has  been effective in 
resolving U.S.-EC  trade problems and as 
the injury found  by the  Commission  can 
only have been caused by  imports  from 
other countries,  the  ITC  might  want to 
consider restraints on  imports  from  these 
other countries  similar to those contained 
in the Arrangement as the most  appropriate 
form of Section  201 relief. 
4.  The Arrangement limits exports  from  the European 
Community  to the u.s.  only until  31  December  1985. 
What will happen after that date? 
Let me  refer to the last paragraph of letters 
exchanged between Secretary of Commerce  Baldrige 
and Vice President Davignon:  "Consultation 
between  the  EC  and the US  will be  held in 1985 
to review the desirability of extending  and 
possibly modifying the Arrangement". - 12  -
V.  The  attitude of the U.S.  Steel Industry and the 
petitioners to the Arrangement. 
1.  The  Arrangement  is of great economic  and 
political importance  for  the relationship 
between European  Community  and u.s.  and 
between  European  steel industry and U.S . 
steel industry.  .  · 
Its value  and beneficial effect is clearly 
recognized  by part of the u.s.  steel industry. 
In its statement to Commission  in these 
proceedings,  United States Steel Corporation 
said: 
"U.S.  Steel believes that the  Agreement is very 
important to it, to the domestic steel industry, 
to the United States,  and  indeed to the ECSC •. 
For the most part,  the ECSC  has  faithfully 
adhered to the Agreement;  and the Government 
of the United States has worked diligently to 
assure that the  Agreem~nt functions within both 
the spirit and the  letter of the arrangement. 
u.s.  Steel  in turn has  honoured its commitment  and 
does not want any  actions to be taken that 
would  jeopardize the Agreement's continued 
existence".  "Its continuation,  undiminished 
and rigorously adhered to,  is a  matter of 
paramount  importance and concern to u.s.  Steel". - 13  -
2.  Unfortunately,  position of petitioners toward 
Arrangement is less clear. 
According to petition,  Bethlehem Steel and 
United Steelworkers  seem to recognize  that 
additional restrictions for  imports  from  the 
European  Communities  are not necessary.  Let 
me  quote  from their petition: 
"If all steel imports can be controlled,  ~ 
they have  been  from  the E.E.C.,  the domestic 
steel producers would benefit from  increased 
demand  through higher and more  profitable 
operating rates and prices  ••• 
The relief being  sought need not alter the 
relative participation in·the -u.s.  market  by 
European and Japanese producers who  have 
traded during  1983  under an-inter-government 
agreement  limiting exports or who  have exported 
less steel to the United States in the very 
recent past." 
Also,  petitioners prehearing brief on  remedy 
uses  language which  indicates that petitioners 
do  not want to interfere with Arrangement. - 14  -
However,  the prehearing brief on  remedy contains 
also passages which  seem to go  in the  opposite 
direction. 
3.  In order to avoid any misunderstandings,  European 
Community  wants to be absolutely clear about 
: 
possible consequences  under  GATT,  if the 
remedy  in this case  interferes with Arrangement. 
The  European  Community disagrees with statement 
of petitioners that as the  EC  has already 
limited their imports  of steel products to the 
United States, Article  XIX  would not permit to 
retaliate against US  steel exporters.  (page  83 
prehearing brief on  remedy). 
Also,  European  community disagrees with the view 
that a  market share quota would not.invite 
authorized retaliation by the community  because 
the market shares of the European  Community 
would. ·.remain at roughly their present level 
(pg.  83  prehearing brief on  remedy). 
European  Community is convinced that one  has 
to distinguish between  two  situations which 
are  fundamentally different: -. 
- 15  -
First situation:  The Arrangement  remains  unaffected; 
all import restrictions result from  the 
Arrangement.  In this case,  the  Community will 
not ask  for  compensation or eventually retaliate, 
as it has  agreed to forego  its rights under 
Article XIX  of the  GATT. 
Second  situation:  Additional  import restrictions 
are  imposed.  In this case the Community  is 
clearly entitled to compensation  and eventually 
to retaliate for all additional restrictions, 
i.e. restrictions which .go  beyond the terms 
of the Arrangement 
either with respect to product coverage, 
or with  respect to quantities,  ..  . ; 
or with respect to flexibility, 
or with respect to· consultations, 
or with respect to duration. 
The  same  is obviously true for measures other 
than quantitative restrictions,  like tariffs. 
There  is no  doubt that the Community will make  use 
of these rights.  If the European  ~ornmunity decides 
to terminate the Arrangement,  it will recover its 
rights under Article XIX  of the  GATT  not  only·· for 
the additional restrictions,  but also  for those - 16  -
which  flow  today  - without  any  compensation  - from  the 
Arrangement. 
The  EC  contests the petitioners'  assertion that 
"negative ramifications are unlikely".  Indeed, 
in this context,  the  specialty steels case of  1983 
provides  a  recent and  concrete  example  of  wha~ can 
happen  when  unilateral measures  are  taken.  There 
is also the danger that unavoidable retaliatory 
action may  damage  the  interests of  innocent bystanders. 
4.  According to petitioners  "of the total 212.3 
billion in u.s.  exports only  some  31  billion 
would  be  subject to retaliation or withdrawal 
of  concessions"  (page  85  prehearing briefing 
remedy.)  From  the point of view of the 
European  Community,  our most  important-exports 
to the u.s.  are at stake: 
In  1983,  EC  exported  4.1 million tons of steel 
products;  with a  1.6 billion dollar value. 
To  put this into perspective:  Steel exports 
to the u.s.  have  for  the European  Community  a 
significance similar to that for the u.s.  of exports 
of  soyabeans to Europe  (U.S.  soyabean exports to the 
EC  in 1983  were  2.4 billion dollars). ' . 
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5.  The  European  Community  therefore repeats 
conclusion of page  41  of its prehearing brief: 
"The  Arrangement provides the domestic  industries 
with all the protection they require  from 
imports  from  EC  countries.  Import relief_within 
the meaning of the escape  clause is,  therefore, 
already in effect with regard to imports  from 
the EC,  and  no  further action against EC 
imports is "necessary".  Any  additional 
restrictions would  be contrary to the 
express  language  and  intent of the statute. 
Even if the commission  feels that it cannot 
recommend  an  OMA  to the President under  section 
20l(d) (1) (A),  it can  nevertheless recommend 
that insofar as  imports  from the EC  are 
concerned,  the terms of the Arrangement provide 
appropriate relief for  purposes of this 
investigation and exclude  imports  from  the 
EC  from  its relief recommendation". 